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NOTE
An International Standard of Partial Compensation Upon the
Expropriation of an Alien's Property
by Christopher P. Bauman*
Imagine yourself as the owner of an oil and gas exploration company,
whose assets in a lucrative venture in some far-away country were
suddenly nationalized.1 To add insult to injury, the expropriating state,
relying on what is asserted as an "international standard of compensa-
tion", determines that it need not compensate you for the full fair market
value2 of your venture. No doubt, you would feel that your rights had
been violated, and would not soon risk any more of your wealth in for-
eign investments.
Now imagine yourself in a policy making position in the government
of the above-mentioned nationalizing state. Assume that a sector of your
country's economy is dominated by foreign investors. Not only is this
sector of the economy an important source for the future development of
your country, but it is also of strategic importance. You view the domi-
nation by foreign investors as adversely affecting your country's national
identity and its ability to effectively control its economic destiny. Conse-
quently, you feel that you are justified in nationalizing the assets of the
state that are owned and controlled by foreign investors. Unfortunately,
there is no feasible way your country can pay the amount of compensa-
tion required to equal the fair market value of the targeted assets. Is it
equitable for your state to nationalize foreign investment without paying
* J.D. candidate, Case Western Reserve University (1987).
I The terms "nationalization" and "expropriation" are used alternatively throughout the pa-
per. Generally, both terms refer to the acquisition and control of a privately owned business by a
government where at least some compensation is tendered.
2 Fair market value for an ongoing enterprise is usually considered to be the present value of
future returns or capitalized future returns. The magnitude of future return streams (revenues less
expenses), the delay or remoteness in time for the future return streams to reach the investor and the
uncertainty as to the magnitude and delay of the future return stream are used to arrive at an
estimate of all future returns. This estimate is then given a present value by a factor supplied by the
market known as a discounting or capitalization rate.
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full compensation? If not, has the strict enforcement of a full compensa-
tion requirement unjustly limited your country's exercise of its
sovereignty?
Whether an international standard of compensation upon the expro-
priation of alien-owned property exists is debatable.3 Prior to World
War I, a general standard of prompt, adequate and full compensation
existed among capital exporting countries and developing countries or
colonies.4 To be sure, the number of expropriations compared to post
World War I were few. However, beginning with the mass expropria-
tions following the Russian revolution, "cataclysmic historical events
and metamorphosis in economic theory and systems have caused the par-
tial disintegration of principles that appeared to prevail in 1914."1
The principle of at least some form of compensation is still held by
most societies of the industrialized West.6 The Revised Restatement of
Foreign Relations Law of the United States (the "Revised Restatement")
3 The present U.S. position, first enunciated by Secretary of State Hull in his exchange with the
Mexican Government involving expropriated agrarian land owned by U.S. nationals, has been the
standard of "prompt, adequate and effective compensation." L. HENKIN, R. PUGH, 0. SCHACHTER
& H. SMIT, INTERNATIONAL LAW, CASES AND MATERIALS 687-89 (1980). This standard, while
consistently applied by the executive and legislative branches, has not been as readily recognized by
U.S. courts as an international standard. Banco de Cuba v. Sabbatino, 376 U.S. 398 (1964); Banco
Nacional de Cuba v. Chase Manhattan Bank, 658 F.2d 875 (2d Cir. 1981).
International Tribunals have recognized an international obligation to pay compensation when
alien property is expropriated, but the "prompt adequate and effective" standard is not used. The
two most often cited cases in this area, the Chorzow case and the Norwegian Shipowners Claims
arbitration case refer only to "fair" and "just" compensation respectively. Case concerning the Fac-
tory at Chorzow (Ger v. Pol), 1928 P.C.I.J., ser.A, No. 17 at 46: Norwegian Shipowners' Claims
(Nor. v. U.S.) 1 R. INT'L ARB. AWARDS 307, 339-41 (1922). However, International arbitral
awards have ruled that compensation for expropriations should include a going concern valuation
(e.g. present value of reasonably ascertainable expected earnings). Sapphire International Petro-
leums Ltd. v. National Iranian Oil Co. 35 I.L.R. 136, 188-91 (Calvin, Arb. 1963); Texaco Overseas
Petroleum Co. (TOPCO) v. Libya, 53 I.L.R. 420, 508 (Depuy, Arb. 1977)
Most recently, the Iran-U.S. Claims Tribunal (the "Tribunal") established under the Algiers
Agreement of 1981 (initialed Jan. 19, 1981, 81 DEP'T. ST. BULL., Feb. 1981, at 1 reprinted in 20
I.L.M. 230 (1981)) has generally upheld going concern valuation for expropriated property. In
American International Group, Inc. v. Iran Award No. 93-2-3 (Dec. 19, 1983), reprinted in Iranian
Assets Litigation Rep. 7,744, 7,750 (Jan. 13, 1984), the Tribunal held that the proper method of
valuing compensation is the "value [of] the company as a going concern..." Similarly, in Starrett
Housing Corp. v. Iran, Award No. I.T.L. 32-24-1 (Dec. 19, 1983) reprinted in Iranian Assets Litiga-
tion Rep. 7,685, 7,703 (Jan. 13, 1984), an expert was appointed by the Tribunal to find the "value" of
the expropriated property by considering the "discounted cash flow method of valuation." Finally,
in Tippetts, Abbott, McCarthy, Stratton v. TAMS-AFFA Consulting Engineers of Iran, Award No.
141-7-2 (June 29, 1984) reprinted in Mealeys Litigation Rep., Iranian Claims 966 (July 6, 1981) the
Tribunal held that the expropriated party "is entitled under international law and general principles
of law to compensation for the full value of the property of which it was deprived."
4 H. STEINER & D. VAGTS, TRANSNATIONAL LEGAL PROBLEMS 479 (1986).
5 Id.
6 Id. at 483.
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has reaffirmed the principle that "when foreign properties are expropri-
ated there must be compensation and such compensation must be just."'
"Just compensation" is defined as "equivalent to the value of the prop-
erty taken.... usually 'fair market value'." 8 However, the Revised Re-
statement equivocably suggests that the just compensation requirement is
strictly a U.S. standard rather than an international standard of compen-
sation.9 Furthermore, the Restatement recognizes "exceptional circum-
stances" that may warrant "some deviation from the standard of
compensation. . . [that] would satisfy the requirement of just
compensation." °10
A claim for compensation by expropriated parties under interna-
tional law must be grounded in an implied agreement among states found
in custom or practice and usage. In other words, most domestic as well
as international law must have recognized the protection of foreign pri-
vate property rights through compensation. 1 By drawing analogies to
U.S. corporate law and regulatory schemes affecting the values given to
private property interests, this note will attempt to illustrate generally
acceptable policy justifications for exceptions to a fair market value com-
pensation standard in specific circumstances.
The note begins with a brief analysis of policies and perspectives
which frame existing attempts to define an international standard of
compensation upon the expropriation of an alien's property. This analy-
sis is followed by a delineation of specific circumstances under which a
partial compensation standard may apply. Generally acceptable policy
justifications to support the legality of a partial compensation standard
are then identified and discussed. Finally, brief mention is made as to the
proper method of valuation of partial compensation in light of the policy
justifications.
1. The Scenario
The debate over a standard of compensation to an alien upon the
expropriation of his property by the state has generally divided interna-
7 RESTATEMENT (REVISED) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES (Tent.
Draft No. 7, 1986). [Hereinafter REVISED RESTATEMENT].
8 Id. at 121 comment b. See also, supra, note 2.
9 Id. at 122 comment d. For an in-depth analysis of the position that full compensation has
always been the historical compensation standard see generally B.A. WORTLEY, EXPROPRIATION IN
PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW (1959); Claggett, Protection of Foreign Investment Under the Revised
Restatement, 25 VA J. INT'L L. 73 (1984); Robinson Expropriation in the Restatement (Revised), 78
Am. J. INT'L L. 176 (1984).
10 Id. at 121 comment c. The U.S. formulation of "just, adequate and effective compensation"
has met strong resistance from developing states and has not made its way into multilateral agree-
ments or declarations, or been universally utilized by international tribunals .... See also Robinson,
supra note 9.
11 id. at 122 comment d.
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tional legal scholars into two camps.' 2 In one camp are those scholars
interested in protecting and fostering foreign investment. 13 This camp
views any standard of compensation that does not guarantee a foreign
investor full compensation for his investment at capitalized going con-
cern valuation, as inherently evil. "As a matter of principle, the obliga-
tion to pay full compensation for expropriated property is merely an
application of a universally recognized moral imperative-'Thou shall not
steal'-to relations between a state and a foreign investor."' 4 The propo-
nents of this view do not recognize any exception to the full compensa-
tion requirement. "To compensate means to give equal weight, to repay
the loss as measured, in the case of an ongoing enterprise, by the fair
market value or going concern value of the enterprise. Paying less-than-
full compensation is simply theft of that part of the expropriated prop-
erty that remains uncompensated."'" Under this full compensation stan-
dard, the State is considered primarily as an institution for the protection
of property rights.16
The opposing view uses the sovereign right of every State to regulate
the use of property to foster economic and political objectives, as the
rationale supporting an international standard of partial compensation
upon expropriation. 7 In support of this contention they cite the Charter
of Economic Rights and Duties for States.'" Article 1 of the Charter
provides that "[e]very State has the sovereign and inalienable right to
choose its economic system .... ."" Article 2 states that "[e]very State
has and shall freely exercise full permanent sovereignty, including posses-
sion, use and disposal over all its wealth, natural resources and economic
activities. '20 In the view of this camp, potential restrictions upon the
independence of State sovereignty, such as a full compensation require-
ment, cannot be presumed.2'
Also cited as supporting a partial compensation standard is the
United Nation's declaration on Permanent Sovereignty Over Natural Re-
12 See generally H.J. STEINER & VAGTS, supra note 5, at 480-83.
13 Schachter, Compensation for Expropriation, 78 AM. J. INT'L L. 121, 122 (1984).
14 Dawson & Weston, "Prompt, Adequate and Effective'" A Universal Standard of Compensa-
tion? 30 FORDHAM L. REV. 727-28 (1961-62).
15 Claggett, supra note 9, at 75.
16 Id.
17 B.A. WORTLEY, supra note 9, at 12-13.
18 See generally Dawson & Weston, supra note 14, at 728; Arechaga, State Responsibility for
the Nationalization of Foreign owned Property, in INTERNATIONAL LAW: A CONTEMPORARY PER-
SPECTIVE 546-47 (Falk, Kratochwil, Mendlovitz ed. 1985); EXPROPRIATION IN THE AMERICAS 5
(Lowenfeld ed. 1971).
19 G.A. Res. 3281, 29 U.N. GAOR, Supp. (No. 31) 50, U.N. Doc. A9631 (1974) reprinted in
69 AM. J. INT'L L. at 484, 486 (1975).
20 Id. at 486.
21 Id. at 487.
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sources.22 Like the Charter of Economic Rights and Duties of States, the
U.N. declaration attaches particular importance to the right of States to
permanent sovereignty over their natural wealth and resources in order
to promote their own economic development.23 Both the Charter and
the Declaration require "appropriate" compensation, while omitting any
reference to either "full" or "partial" compensation.24 "Appropriate"
compensation allows for consideration of various factors in addition to
compensating the expropriated party.2" For example, in determining the
amount of compensation required upon expropriation it might be consid-
ered "appropriate" to give weight to the needs and capabilities of the
expropriating state.26
The proponents of the partial compensation standard emphasize a
State's sovereignty over all property rights including alien-owned prop-
erty which may be redistributed at the will of the State.27 The full com-
pensation requirement is perceived as a potential "veto power over
legitimate attempts by poorer nations to achieve fundamental economic
and social reform."2 If a state's expropriation of an alien's property is
only justified if accompanied by the payment of full compensation, then
the inability to pay full compensation might prevent a state from exercis-
ing its right of sovereignty.29 State sovereignty should not be
subordinated to a state's ability to pay full compensation.3 °
The Revised Restatement is perceived by its reporters as an attempt
to achieve a consensus in the U.S. regarding an international standard of
compensation.31 An international standard of compensation will require
a compromise between the proponents of the "full" and "partial" com-
pensation standards.32 The Revised Restatement requires that "just
compensation" be afforded to an alien whose property has been expropri-
22 Case of S.S. "Lotus" (Fr. v. Turk.), P.C.I.J. ser. A, No. 10, at 8 (1927) enunciates the gen-
eral principle of international law that a rule of international law must be consented to by states.
"By stressing consent, [Lotus] attempts to reconcile international obligation with national sover-
eignty." H. STEINER & D. VAGTS, supra note 4, at 299.
23 G.A. Res. 1803, 17 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 17) at 15, U.N. Doc. A5217 (1962), reprinted in
57 AM. J. INT'L L. at 710, 711-12 (1963).
24 Id. at 711-12.
25 G.A. Res. 3281 supra note 19, at art. 2(c) at 487; G.A. Res. 1803, supra note 23, at art. 1.4.,
at 712.
26 Arechaga, State Responsibility for the Nationalization of Foreign-owned Property, in INTER-
NATIONAL LAw: A CONTEMPORARY PERSPECTIVE 546, 550 (1985).
27 Schachter, supra note 13, at 129.
28 See generally B.A. WORTLEY, supra note 9, at 12-13; EXPROPRIATION IN THE AMERICAS 1-
5 (Lowenfeld ed. 1971); Arechaga, supra note 26, at 546-50.
29 Dawson & Weston, supra note 14, at 735.
30 Arechaga, supra note 26, at 547.
31 Dawson & Weston, supra note 14, at 937.
32 REVISED RESTATEMENT, supra note 7, at 121 comment b.
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ated.33 "Just compensation" is admittedly an imprecise term.34 How-
ever, the Comment to the Revised Restatement states that "in the
absence of exceptional circumstances, compensation to be just must be
equivalent to the value of the property taken. ... ,3' The Comment fur-
ther defines "value of the property" as fair market value when determina-
ble, which should take into account present going concern value.36
Consequently, compensation to be just, must be full compensation. Nev-
ertheless, specifically mentioned in the Comment as an example of an
"exceptional case" or "special circumstance" where deviation from a full
compensation standard would not render the taking "unjust," is a na-
tional program of land reform, where a requirement of full compensation
might sabotage the program because of the State's incapacity to pay.37
However, such a departure from the general rule of full compensation on
the basis of exceptional circumstances is "unwarranted if [(a)] the prop-
erty taken had been used in a business enterprise that was specifically
authorized or encouraged by the state; (b) the property was an enterprise
taken for operation as a going concern by the state....
The Revised Restatement expresses a firm commitment to a full
compensation standard which is limited only by the presence of "excep-
tional circumstances." 3 No indication is given by the Revised Restate-
ment or its Reporters as to what these exceptional circumstances are,
except a passing reference to land reform.' ° The Revised Restatement's
attempt to define what "exceptional circumstances" are not, does not
make sense if land reform is an example of a possible exception to the full
compensation standard. Nationalization of foreign owned agricultural
land is property taken that was being "used in a business enterprise...
specifically authorized by the state"41, and property "taken for operation
as a going concern by the state. ..."' Instead, the Revised Restatement
simply relegates any deviation of the full compensation standard to a
"question of international law."'4 3 The ambiguity surrounding "excep-
tional circumstances" to full compensation may be a result of pressure
that was brought to bear on the Reporters of the Revised Restatement
between the Sixth Draft and the Final Draft, by those who assailed any
relaxation of the full compensation standard as an arbitrary creation of a
33 Dawson & Weston, supra note 14, at 755.
34 REVISED RESTATEMENT, supra note 7, at 122 comment d.
35 Id. at 134, reporters' note 3.
36 Id. at 122, comment d.
37 Id.
38 Id. at 135, 136 reporters' note 3.
39 Id. at 123, comment d.
40 Id. at 119, § 712(1); 122 comment d.
41 Id. at 123, comment d; 135 reporters' note 3.
42 Id. at 123, comment d.
43 Id. at 122, comment d.
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new legal standard without international foundation or support, that de-
stabilizes the expectations of investors and effectively scares away foreign
investment.' This is due to the apparent difficulty in formulating or jus-
tifying an international standard permitting partial compensation that
would meet any objective test of reason, justice or practicality.4 5
If some compensation is admitted to be owing upon the expropria-
tion of an alien's property when exceptional circumstances are present,
on what basis could partial compensation be deemed satisfactory or just?
If, as the Revised Restatement asserts there are situations where an ex-
propriating State may be justified in paying partial compensation,46 any
such exception must be rooted in policy considerations that are accepta-
ble to foreign investors and not simply arbitrary acts of state. In order to
examine policy justifications in support of partial compensation, it is nec-
essary to first determine the context in which partial compensation policy
justifications are acceptable.
2. The Specific Circumstances
The Revised Restatement limits any payment of partial compensa-
tion to "exceptional cases" I such as a large-scale expropriation under
circumstances in which the expropriating State would otherwise have an
overwhelming financial burden." That such an expropriation would be
an exception to a full compensation standard can be inferred from the
specific mention of land reform in the Comment to the Revised
Restatement.49
The reporters of both the Revised Restatement and its predecessor,
the Restatement (Second)5 °, recognized land reform as a possible excep-
tion to a full compensation standard.51 Land reform is an integral part of
an underdeveloped nation's economic and political attempts at economic
reform, and usually involves large-scale nationalizations in order to effec-
tuate a program of redistribution. 2 However, simply because the nation-
alization is required for a State's economic reforms and is of such
magnitude as to render full compensation impossible unless at the ex-
pense of the economic reform program, these considerations should not
44 Claggett, supra note 9, at 73-4; Robinson, Expropriation in the Restatement (revised), 78 AM.
J. INT'L L. 176, 178 (1984).
45 Claggett, supra note 9, at 93.
46 REVISED RESTATEMENT, supra note 7, at 122 comment b; 135 reporters' note 3.
47 Id.
48 Schachter, supra note 13, at 124 (Quoting Sohn & Baxter, Responsibility of States for Injuries
to the Economic Injuries of Aliens, 55 AM. J. INT'L L. 545, 560 (1961).
49 REVISED RESTATEMENT, supra note 7, at 122-23 comment d; 135-36 reporters' note 3.
50 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES (1965).
51 Id at 567; REVISED RESTATEMENT, supra note 7 at 123 comment d; 135 Reporters' note 3.
52 RESTATEMENT (SECOND), supra note 50, at 567.
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by themselves render the nationalization an exception to the full compen-
sation standard.5 3 To do so would be to ignore the legitimate claims of
investors. Having assumed the risk that their investment might prove
uneconomical, the investors initially demanded and received certain
guarantees before their investment was made-namely the continuity of
their investment at least until profits commensurable with the risk associ-
ated with the investment can be recovered. Foreign investors must have
reasonable assurances not only of the recoupment of the original invest-
ment, but profits sufficient to warrant the making of the investment in the
first place, ie., compensation for the risk taken. 4 The higher the risk, the
more excessive the profits required to compensate the investor will be."
Whether the nationalization is to be regarded as an exception to the
full compensation standard, is a two-fold inquiry. On the one hand, the
scope of the nationalization and the capacity of a State to pay must be
considered. 6 On the other hand, an exception to a full compensation
standard may ultimately discourage beneficial large-scale foreign invest-
ment by destabilizing an investor's expectations regarding ownership of,
and profits from, property located abroad. 7 Therefore, an exceptional
circumstance which may give rise to a partial compensation standard
must be one where: a) the investor has at least recovered his initial in-
vestment and received profits in a sufficient amount to justify the initial
risk associated with the investment; and b) where the nationalization is
required to assist the host State in the reorganization and administration
of a sector of its economy, but a requirement of full compensation would
prevent the State's attempts to achieve economic or social reform.
Another example of an exceptional circumstance where a partial
compensation standard might apply is the previously mentioned case of a
developing State whose capabilities in a particular economic sector are
substantially owned and controlled by foreign investors. In such a situa-
tion, it may be entirely legitimate and reasonable for a State to national-
ize the foreign owned assets. 58 A State's purposes for nationalizing this
sector of its economy might range from a security need, to an exercise of
control over its producing capabilities, to a nationalistic desire to own
and control a major source of revenues for the State. If foreign investors
have been given the opportunity to exploit the State's natural resources
53 Weigel & Weston, Valuation Upon the Deprivation of Foreign Enterprises: A Policy-Oriented
Approach to the Problem of Compensation Under International Law, in THE VALUATION OF NA-
TIONALIZED PROPERTY IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 3, 13 (R. Lillich ed. 1972).
54 Claggett, supra note 9, at 94.
5- Weigel & Weston supra note 53, at 22.
56 Axelrod & Mendlovitz, Expropriation and Underdeveloped Nations: The Analogy to U.S.
Constitutional Law, ESSAYS ON EXPROPRIATION 83, 115 (1967).
57 Weigel & Weston, supra note 53, at 5.
58 Arechaga, supra note 26, at 546, 547.
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to the extent required for a sufficient return on their investment (i.e. re-
coupment of the initial investment plus profits required to match the in-
vestors initial expectations determined by the risk associated with that
investment when made), and the State is fiscally unable to pay an amount
equal to the fair market value (capitalized going concern rate) of the na-
tionalized industry, then a partial compensation standard would be just.
(a) Recovery of Initial Risk
Upon nationalization, the foreign investor has had his entitlement to
the benefits of future extractions transferred to the host State for less-
than-full value. 9 For example, an investor determines at the time the
investment is made that he must receive $8 back on a $5 investment, or a
$3 profit, to compensate him for the risk associated with that particular
investment. As fortune would have it, subsequent to the investment of
$5, the projected returns are adjusted upward, and the investor can now
expect to receive a $6 profit, or twice the initial expectation. At this
moment the State intervenes and cuts off the investor by expropriating
the investment. What should be the amount of compensation paid by the
State to the investor? Under a partial compensation standard, the inves-
tor would be due his initial investment and the initial expectation of prof-
its required to induce the investor into making the investment, or $8.
However, the investor would not receive the additional $3 in expected
profits. Because the investor has earned profits sufficient to warrant the
making of the investment, the risk associated with foreign investments
has not been increased so as to deter future foreign investment in the
nationalizing State. The partial compensation standard will not result
"in reducing the flow of investment, or in increasing the rate of earnings
needed to cover the added risk."6
(b) Assisting the State in Economic Reorganization
By allowing the host State to pay partial compensation for the na-
tionalized industry, there has been a proper recognition of the impor-
tance of the development of States and their political stability in the
formulation of an international standard. "[T]he utility of prescribing an
international standard for compensation depends upon the substance of
the standard selected. To be useful at all, the standard must be attainable
by reforming governments .... [T]he standard must be one that a re-
forming government can meet without sacrificing its interests in political
59 Baade, Permanent Sovereignty Over Natural Resources & Wealth in ESSAYS ON EXPROPRIA-
TION 18-19 (Miller & Stanger ed. 1967).
60 Robinson, Expropriation in the Restatement (Revised) 78 AM. J. INT'L L. 176, 178 (1984).
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stability and national development."61
If, on the other hand, the host State cannot reasonably claim an
inability to pay full compensation for the nationalized industry62 then
allowing for partial compensation would permit the nationalizing State
to unjustifiably enrich itself at the expense of a foreign investor. 3 "The
nationalizing State would be taking undue advantage of the fact that eco-
nomic resources originating in another State had penetrated its territorial
domain.'"" The doctrine of unjust enrichment is relevant because it em-
phasizes equitable considerations by focusing on the benefits obtained by
the nationalizing State rather than the loss suffered by the foreign inves-
tor.65 "The notion of appropriate compensation is flexible enough to al-
low a decisionmaker, whether domestic or international, to take into
account elements of unjust enrichment in the background of the invest-
ment in determining what, under the circumstances, constitutes appro-
priate compensation."66 Therefore, in a situation where the nationalizing
state is able to pay full compensation, the foreign investor would have a
right to be compensated for all future expected earnings which result
from his profitable investment and not simply those attributable to initial
expectations at the time of the investment.
Likewise, unless the nationalization is an effort by the State to effec-
tuate economic reform, the State will not be justified in paying partial
compensation.67 Defaulting on privileges and guarantees granted to the
foreign investor by the host State to obtain the original investment can
only be justified when overriding goals of international economic stability
and progress are present.68 Otherwise, nationalization would be "con-
trary to broad international policy objectives," and would ultimately dis-
courage future foreign investment.69 However, when a nationalization
with partial compensation occurs as part of a State's program of eco-
nomic reform, it cannot be said to be done at the expense of international
justice.70 No State can rationally be expected to undermine its promo-
61 Karst, Land Reform in International Law in ESSAYS ON EXPROPRIATION 55 (Miller &
Stanger ed. 1967).
62 The expropriated party should be able to show that based upon a capitalized going concern
value, the state is able to pay compensation without sabotaging its economic reforms. The burden
would be on the state to show why it could not pay full compensation.
63 Arechaga, supra note 26, at 548.
64 Id.
65 Id at 549.
66 Id. at 550 (quoting Falk, The New States and International Legal Order, 118 Recueil des
Cours: Academic de Droit International [R.A.D.I.] 1, 29 (1966)).
67 See generally, EXPROPRIATION IN THE AMERICAS: A COMPARATIVE LAW STUDY 2-5 (A.
Lowenfeld ed. 1971).
68 Dawson & Weston, supra note 14, at 753.
69 Robinson, supra note 60, at 178.
70 Karst, supra note 61, at 42-3.
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tion of a more equitable and progressive economy merely because of a
dependency upon external markets, or a need to cultivate the good will
required to attract foreign investment.71 To do so would be to subject a
State's sovereignty to the foreign investor's claims to a guarantee of con-
tinuity of investment.72
3. Policy Considerations
Only under circumstances where a foreign investor has been allowed
to recoup his initial investment plus profits commensurate with the inves-
tor's initial expectations given the original risk, and the State is unable to
pay full compensation for a nationalization required to meet economic
aspirations, will a nationalization be viewed as "just" with partial com-
pensation. However, what basis is there to support deprivation without
indemnification of a foreign investor's right to the fruits of his invest-
ment? By limiting an investor's claim under exceptional circumstances
to excess profits sufficient to justify the original risk, an investor is pre-
cluded from "future earnings (or benefits) that [he] would expect to ob-
tain, and on the burdens that [he] would hope to avoid, as a result of
ownership."73 If a standard of compensation is to have any meaning, it
must be one that will "encourage those foreign investments that can be
said to produce a net benefit to the host country ....
A standard of compensation that limits an investor's expected future
return must be explained in terms of overriding policy considerations
that are normally acceptable to foreign investors. The partial compensa-
tion standard is objected to on the ground that it increases the risk asso-
ciated with foreign investments by cutting off a guarantee of future
investment.7" Therefore, the risk objected to must be peculiar to foreign
investments. If the risk is not uniquely a foreign investment risk, then
the risk associated with partial compensation has policy justifications rec-
ognized, practiced and accepted elsewhere by the investor.
a) Analogy to Corporate law
When a foreign investor's property is nationalized under normal cir-
cumstances, the investor's claim is for full compensation.7 6 Full compen-
sation is valued by the present value of future earnings or capitalized
going concern rate.77 Full compensation under normal circumstances is
71 Weigel & Weston, supra note 53, at 12.
72 See text at 9.
73 Id. at 19.
74 Id. at 14.
75 Claggett, supra note 9, at 95.
76 REVISED REsTATEMENT, supra note 7, at 122 comment d.
77 Id
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necessary in order for the nationalizing State to continue to encourage
and obtain future foreign investment.78 Even if some foreign investors
will not be deterred by partial compensation, under normal circum-
stances, many will be.79 On the other hand, guaranteeing investors
against partial loss will tend to offset this reaction.8" As asserted previ-
ously, full compensation is "just" under normal circumstances as it guar-
antees to the foreign investor that he will receive a fair return on his
investment.81 Full compensation includes future expectations of earnings
over the amount required simply to compensate the initial risk taken.82
Consequently, partial compensation under circumstances were the state
could fully compensate the expropriated party, would unjustly enrich the
nationalizing State. If investors are to recognize the existence of excep-
tional circumstances warranting partial compensation, there must be
some underlying policy generally accepted by investors that can justify
reducing an investor's claim in exceptional circumstances to exclude fu-
ture expected returns over the amount necessary to compensate the ini-
tial risk taken by the investor.
United States Revised Model Business Corporation Act 83 does not
require that corporations compensate their shareholders if a final distri-
bution upon dissolution constitutes a diminishment in the shareholder's
wealth.84 For example, corporation C sells 10 shares to shareholder S for
$40. S has invested $40 in C because based on expected future earnings,
S will receive at least $10 within a fixed period of time in future distribu-
tions. S also has a limited claim to the $40 he contributed should C be
dissolved and liquidated. Now suppose that C is dissolved and its assets
liquidated even though C continues to have expected future earnings of
$10. S's entitlement to a liquidating distribution is limited to a pro rata
share of the net assets of the corporation after all liabilities have been
paid.85 S has no claim to the expected $10 in future earnings. There is
no "guaranteed" expected future rate of return on his investment. In
fact, S may not even receive back the full $40 constituting his original
contribution if C's liabilities at the moment of dissolution leave less net
assets than what was originally contributed to the corporation by its
shareholders.86 In other words, there are generally accepted exceptional
circumstances where an investor in a corporation with expected future
78 Robinson, supra note 60, at 178.
79 Weigel & Weston, supra note 53, at 5.
80 Id.
81 Id. at 19-20.
82 Id. at 20-23.
83 REVISED MODEL BUSINESS CORPORATION AcT ANN. (1985).
84 Id. at §§ 6.01(b), 14.05(a)(3)(4).
85 Id. at § 6.01(b).
86 Id. at §§ 14.01(4), 6.40(c)(1), (f).
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earnings, may involuntarily have his claim to distributions of these earn-
ings terminated, and may even receive by way of a liquidating distribu-
tion less than his original contribution.
Furthermore, say S has invested his $40 in corporation C, whose
controlling shareholders happen to be two young computer wizards.
There is a distinct possibility that the young wizards' ideas could revolu-
tionize the computer era. Consequently, the presence of these two dyna-
mos are the corporation's principle asset. Unfortunately, just as S begins
to realize some of his expected future returns, the two computer wizards
have a parting of the ways and decide to dissolve the corporation. Obvi-
ously, S would much prefer that no dissolution take place, but as a non-
controlling shareholder he will have no option but to go along with the
dissolution.87 In this hypothetical, the dissolution of C, like a nationali-
zation, forces the investor S to part with his investment prematurely. S
will receive the current break-up value of the assets rather than the capi-
talized going concern value, which means that S has no claim to expected
future earnings.88 This is true even though S's decision to make his in-
vestment took into account those expected future earnings that he has
now lost as a result of the dissolution. Dissolutions that cause a share-
holder to lose expected future returns is a risk incidental to investments
in corporations by shareholders. The risk presented by such a dissolu-
tion is similar to nationalizations with partial compensation. A national-
ization with partial compensation in exceptional circumstances will limit
an investor's claims to expected future earnings to those necessary to
compensate for the initial risk of investment only. Therefore, the type of
risk associated with partial compensation-that an investor's continued
ownership of an investment may be involuntarily terminated in excep-
tional circumstances without recoupment of expected future returns-is
not a type of risk that is limited to nationalizations of foreign
investments.
On the other hand, dissolutions are generally distinguishable from
nationalizations on two important grounds. First, dissolutions occur
when investors affirmatively vote to have the corporation liquidated. 89
Nationalizations, however, do not take into account the investors'
desires. In the same fashion, non-controlling shareholders' desires are
rarely taken into account by controlling shareholders in dissolutions of
corporations. 90
Secondly, it seems unlikely that an investor would vote to terminate
his investment by dissolution as long as the going concern valuation of
87 Id. at § 13.02(a)(3), (b).
88 See generally Weigel & Weston, supra note 53 at 17-18.
89 REVISED MODEL BUSINEss AcT, supra note 83 at § 14.02.
90 Id at § 13.02(b).
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his investment is more than the current break-up value of the assets less
liabilities. Nevertheless, it is not difficult to imagine situations like the
above-mentioned computer wizards, where a dissolution might indeed
occur even though the expectation of profits would dictate otherwise, and
should be an investment risk that is taken into account. Foreign inves-
tors therefore are precluded from arguing that there is no basis in princi-
ple or policy to justify a partial compensation standard in decisional law
and state practice.9'
b) Regulating Foreign Direct Investment
Nationalizations are but one form of regulating foreign investments.
Other constraints are frequently implemented by host countries to con-
trol the level and quality of foreign investment.9" Although these con-
straints may give rise to conflicts between foreign investors and recipient
host States, the regulations are not considered confiscatory for the most
part,9 3 even though foreign investors have perceived the increased regula-
tion of their investments as a challenge to the future economic interde-
pendence of the international community."4 Conflicts arise as host
countries seek to increasingly exert influence over the investment deci-
sions of foreign investors. 95 The general purpose of regulating foreign
investment is an effort to create jobs, expand exports and therefore spur
economic development.96 Other objectives include increased managerial
control by state nationals, reducing foreign influences, and redistribution
of wealth.97
Trade Related Performance Requirements ("TRPRs") are a widely
used form of regulation of foreign investments by host States, imposed to
insure that foreign investors act in accordance with national policy objec-
tives.98 These objectives might include regional development, training of
workforce, research and development and transfers of technology.99
Typically, TRPRs will require that foreign investors maintain certain ex-
port levels and/or obtain a certain percentage of the value of the final
91 Claggett, supra note 9, at 93.
92 Axelrod & Mendlovitz, supra note 56 at 83.
93 See generally Fisher, Introduction, in REGULATING THE MULTINATIONAL ENTERPRISE:
NATIONAL AND INTERNATIONAL CHALLENGES (Fisher & Turner, ed. 1983).
94 Turner, Canadian Regulation of Foreign Direct Investment, in REGULATING THE MULTINA-
TIONAL ENTERPRISES: NATIONAL AND INTERNATIONAL CHALLENGES 5, 6 (Fisher & Turner, ed.
1983).
95 Id. at 5.
96 Id. at 8.
97 Fisher, supra note 93.
98 Fontheim & Gadbaw, Trade-Related Investment Requirements in REGULATING THE MUL-
TINATIONAL ENTERPRISE: NATIONAL AND INTERNATIONAL CHALLENGES 75 (Fisher & Turner
ed. 1983).
99 Id.
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product from domestic sources. °0 The cost of compliance to foreign in-
vestors will diminish the value of their investment by causing the foreign
investor to pursue -practices that would not otherwise be chosen on an
open market. 01 For example, a foreign investor may invest in produc-
tion locally rather than where the most efficient production would occur,
causing a misallocation of productive resources. 10 2 Likewise, in order to
comply with the local content requirement, a foreign investor may
purchase components from local manufacturers who may not be the
most efficient producers of that product.'
0 3
A diminution in the value of an investment caused by costs associ-
ated with such regulations will ultimately adversely affect the stream of
earnings to the foreign investor, and thereby reduce any future expecta-
tions of profits from that investment."° Since the valuation of an invest-
ment is based on the present value of all future expected earnings,1°5
regulations which decrease expected future returns will adversely affect
the value of the investment.' 6 Likewise, nationalizations which require
partial compensation limit a foreign investor's claim to future earnings
by requiring that only those future profits which warrant the risk taken
by the foreign investor be compensated fully. The effects on foreign in-
vestment valuation by regulations such as TRPRs are similar to national-
izations which require partial compensation in that they both reduce the
expectations associated with the foreign investment. However, one is
seen as contrary to broad international policy objectives 10 7 while the
other has been rationalized as a means to temporarily promote and pro-
tect local industry. 0
If regulations of foreign investment and partially compensated na-
tionalizations have similar effects on the valuation of foreign investment,
it cannot be argued that nationalizations violate foreign investor expec-
tations any more than do other regulations of foreign investment. If a
foreign investor expects that his investment will be subject to certain reg-
ulations that will diminish future returns, a nationalization at partial
compensation which has the same ultimate effect cannot be said to be
outside the investor's experience. The rule governing U.S. regulatory
and tax measures is that "enterprise values which can be realized only
100 Id
101 Id. at 77.
102 Id
103 Jacobsen, Mexican Regulation of the Computer Industry in REGULATING THE MULTINA-
TIONAL ENTERPRISE: NATIONAL AND INTERNATIONAL CHALLENGES 111, 121 (Fisher & Turner
ed. 1983).
104 Axelrod & Mendlovitz, supra note 56 at 91.
105 Clagget, supra note 9, at 21.
106 Axelrod & Mendlovitz, supra note 56 at 98.
107 Robinson, supra note 60 at 178.
108 Fontheim & Gadbaw, supra note 98 at 78.
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through earnings are held subject to destruction through... taxation and
regulation.... [This] regulatory rule supports negligible compensation
for takings." 109
A foreign investor is familiar with policies that decrease the value of
his investment by limiting his expectations regarding future earnings.
Therefore, the effects of partial compensation upon nationalization of a
foreign investment do not necessarily contradict a foreign investor's ex-
pectations. Partial compensation under exceptional circumstances
should not discourage foreign investment as it presents a risk previously
associated with investments under normal circumstances. "[I]t is wrong
and destructive for [foreign investors] to reinforce full-value compensa-
tion as a criterion of taking legality. It is wrong, because to describe an
uncompensated expropriation as illegal may be ... to deny the higher
egalitarian aspirations within our own society."110
4. Valuation of Partial Compensation
Partial compensation differs from full compensation in that the pres-
ent value of all future earnings is not fully compensated. That is, at the
time of nationalization, the foreign investor receives sufficient compensa-
tion to equal an amount that will warrant the taking of the risk associ-
ated with the initial investment. This constitutes "partial compensation"
as not compensated for are those future earnings that exceed an amount
that will satisfy the risk having been taken. Foreign investments, like
most investments, are motivated by a desire for profit.11 ' Accordingly,
the greater the risk associated with a particular investment, the greater
the uncertainty that there is a profit to be had." 2 If foreign investment is
to be encouraged, the compensation standard must be established so that
foreign investors receive at least the present value of expected future
earnings at the time the investment was made, rather than at the time of
deprivation.
When an investor first decides to invest in a foreign state, he decides
to do so because he believes that his investment will reap a certain profit.
In order to capitalize the venture, he must convince other investors that
the investment will achieve a certain minimal return. This future expec-
tation of profits must be guaranteed to investors if the host state is to
encourage future foreign direct investment. However, the expected fu-
ture earnings may be greatly increased if the investment proves to be
more profitable than was at first expected. Any expectation of future
earnings that is greater than the originally projected rate of return need
109 Axelrod & Mendlovitz, supra note 56 at 91.
1o Id. at 115.
111 Weigel & Weston, supra note 53 at 19.
112 Id. at 22.
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not be guaranteed by the nationalizing state in the exceptional
circumstance.
It should not be difficult to separate out a foreign investor's original
projection of expected return from later, expanded projections of future
earnings. In order to make an initial investment, an investor must have
some degree of certainty that he will receive a certain return on his in-
vestment that would warrant the risk. It is this expected future return
that must be compensated, not subsequent expanded expectations of fu-
ture profits due to the success of the venture. Thus under exceptional
circumstances, where a nationalization may be accompanied by partial
compensation, the valuation of the partial compensation must be an
amount which at least equals the present value of expected future earn-
ings at the time the investment was made.
5. Conclusion
This paper attempts to provide existing policy justifications and ra-
tionales, which are generally accepted by investors, to support an inter-
national legal standard under which a State may pay partial
compensation upon nationalizing property under exceptional circum-
stances, while at the same time recognizing that full compensation is the
preferred standard and must be paid under normal circumstances.
An international legal standard of compensation upon nationaliza-
tion that would be generally acceptable, is one that simultaneously recog-
nizes the internal needs of developing States and assures the continued
vitality of foreign investment. "What is urged, is a reappraisal of the
characterization as 'wrongful' of every taking that is not fully compen-
sated. . . recognizing that often the world community's various needs
conflict and require weighing."' "13
113 Karst, supra note 61 at 70.
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